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Tag: post-quantum

4 posts, 1 research paper

Fourteen cryptography ideas that fit on a shirt

Fourteen ideas from applied cryptography, compressed onto shirts without losing what they mean, from trapdoors and side channels to forward secrecy and Y2Q.

Quantum-safe Bitcoin transactions without a soft fork: what the QSB paper actually says

StarkWare's QSB paper shows a quantum-safe way to spend legacy Bitcoin outputs with no soft fork. Here are the honest numbers and the five things it still cannot fix.

PQC Migration Plans Have a ZK Blind Spot

Major PQC migration documents from NIST, NCSC, and the EU omit zero-knowledge verification infrastructure. That gap leaves deployed ZK stacks unaccounted for.

Post-quantum ZK is an architecture problem

Post-quantum migration for ZK proof systems is an architecture problem, not a parameter-tuning problem. A four-layer framework for analyzing where quantum-vulnerable assumptions sit in a proving stack, applied to Zcash, ZKsync Era, and Starknet.

Related

Research papers

Post-Quantum Risk in Deployed Zero-Knowledge Architectures: A Layered Analysis

Zero-knowledge proof systems are now deployed widely in production cryptographic protocols, yet many rely on assumptions (discrete logarithms, pairings, or structured reference strings) that a fault-tolerant quantum computer would break via Shor's algorithm. This systematization of knowledge (SoK) presents a four-layer decomposition (L1 to L4) that separates where quantum risk enters a proof system: arithmetization, polynomial commitment, protocol logic, and non-interactive compilation. Using a two-axis taxonomy that crosses cryptographic impact (structural break, modularly replaceable break, or quantitative degradation) with deployment migration feasibility, we classify the major proof-system families, derive a modularity test for evaluating upgrade paths, and introduce collect now, forge later (CNFL) as the proof-system analogue of harvest-now-decrypt-later. Case studies of Zcash, zkSync Era, and StarkNet show that practical post-quantum outcomes depend on deployment governance and upgrade architecture as much as on cryptographic primitives. The scope covers IOP/PCS-based and algebraic proof families; MPC-in-the-Head constructions are excluded.