1 post, 1 research paper
Post-quantum migration for ZK proof systems is an architecture problem, not a parameter-tuning problem. A four-layer framework for analyzing where quantum-vulnerable assumptions sit in a proving stack, applied to Zcash, ZKsync Era, and Starknet.
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Zero-knowledge proof systems are now deployed in production cryptographic protocols, yet many rely on discrete-log-based or pairing-based assumptions that a fault-tolerant quantum computer would break via Shor's algorithm. We present a four-layer decomposition (arithmetization, polynomial commitment, protocol logic, and non-interactive compilation) that separates where quantum risk enters a proof system. Using a two-axis taxonomy that crosses cryptographic impact (structural break, modularly replaceable break, or quantitative degradation) with deployment migration feasibility, we classify the major proof-system families, derive a modularity test for evaluating upgrade paths, and introduce collect now, forge later (CNFL) as the ZK-specific analogue of harvest-now-decrypt-later. Case studies of Zcash, ZKsync Era, and Starknet show that practical post-quantum outcomes depend on deployment governance and upgrade architecture as much as on cryptographic primitives.
