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Tag: PQC

7 posts, 1 research paper

Quantum-safe Bitcoin transactions without a soft fork: what the QSB paper actually says

StarkWare's QSB paper shows a quantum-safe way to spend legacy Bitcoin outputs with no soft fork. Here are the honest numbers and the five things it still cannot fix.

PQC Migration Plans Have a ZK Blind Spot

Major PQC migration documents from NIST, NCSC, and the EU omit zero-knowledge verification infrastructure. That gap leaves deployed ZK stacks unaccounted for.

Google's quantum threat to Bitcoin: what the paper actually says

A new Google Quantum AI paper shows that breaking Bitcoin's elliptic curve signatures could require fewer than 500,000 physical qubits, roughly a 20x reduction from prior estimates. The result is real. The panic is not.

Why organizations need a cryptographic bill of materials for PQC migration

You cannot migrate what you cannot see. CycloneDX's CBOM capability provides the foundation for post-quantum migration planning, starting with an inventory of every algorithm, key, and certificate.

Post-quantum cryptography: what it is and why migration starts now

An introduction to post-quantum cryptography: what it is, why today's public-key cryptography is at risk, and what NIST's new standards mean for secure communication.

Post-quantum ZK is an architecture problem

Post-quantum migration for ZK proof systems is an architecture problem, not a parameter-tuning problem. A four-layer framework for analyzing where quantum-vulnerable assumptions sit in a proving stack, applied to Zcash, ZKsync Era, and Starknet.

Crypto agility: designing systems that survive broken cryptography

Crypto agility is the ability to swap cryptographic primitives without redesigning systems. What it requires in practice, and why the PQC transition demands it.

Related

Research papers

Post-quantum security of zero-knowledge proof systems

Zero-knowledge proof systems are now deployed in production cryptographic protocols, yet many rely on discrete-log-based or pairing-based assumptions that a fault-tolerant quantum computer would break via Shor's algorithm. We present a four-layer decomposition (arithmetization, polynomial commitment, protocol logic, and non-interactive compilation) that separates where quantum risk enters a proof system. Using a two-axis taxonomy that crosses cryptographic impact (structural break, modularly replaceable break, or quantitative degradation) with deployment migration feasibility, we classify the major proof-system families, derive a modularity test for evaluating upgrade paths, and introduce collect now, forge later (CNFL) as the ZK-specific analogue of harvest-now-decrypt-later. Case studies of Zcash, ZKsync Era, and Starknet show that practical post-quantum outcomes depend on deployment governance and upgrade architecture as much as on cryptographic primitives.